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Trust is an important variable in economics, as several transactions are based on it; unfortunately it is difficult to measure. The recent 
economic literature on social capital shows a positive association between this concept and trust. As social capital is easier to 
measure than trust is, this paper analyzes the possibility of assessing trust measuring social capital using experimental economics. A 
basic trust game is played in three Western European countries with undergraduate students; a questionnaire measures their level of 
social capital, as time spent within social networks. This measure is stronger and more precise than the ones generally used. In 
particular this paper firstly measures social capital as the intensity of a membership to a voluntary organization, while the extant 
literature generally considers only the membership per se. Secondly the use of an experiment instead of a questionnaire allows for 
constructiong a measure of trust which is in principle continuous. Thirdly to play an experiment allows for observing the behaviour 
of the participants better than by the means of a survey. The results are supportive of the fact that trust can be assessed through social 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper deals with the widely recognized importance of trust in economics, and 
with the difficulty of measuring this variable directly. Considering the contributions of the 
social capital to the economic literature, I try to establish a relationship between social 
capital (which is observable and measurable) and trust. I am thus looking for the possibility 
of assessing trust, by observing social capital. As I will discuss further in the paper, this is a 
relevant issue in economics.  
 
Trust “is an important lubricant of a social system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a 
lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word”
1. Basically any 
commercial transaction is based on trust: the buyer trusts that the seller is delivering a good 
or a service in conformity with the contract. On the other hand the seller trusts that the buyer 
will pay the agreed price on time. Trust also enhances the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
large scale organizations (such as governments), as Fukuyama (1995) and La Porta et al. 
(1997) highlight. Trust and trustworthiness are variables difficult to measure, but they are 
important for imperfect markets to work efficiently. In presence of asymmetric information, 
trust and trustworthiness bridge the gap: for example if the lender trusts the borrower 
completely (because he is trustworthy), credit would be less constrained and the cost of 
providing collaterals would be dramatically reduced (see for instance Harris-White, 2003 
and Yunus, 2003). Trust and trustworthiness are thus two fundamental factors in the 
everyday’s economic life.  
 
Moreover, trust has been found to be linked with important economic outcomes such 
as growth: Zack and Knack (2001) show that low trust environments reduce the rate of 
investments, and thus growth. Their theoretical model is substantially supported by 
empirical results over a sample of several countries: trust is a fundamental ingredient of 
economic growth. The robustness of these results is confirmed by Beugelsdijk et al. (2004): 
they widen Zack and Knack’s sample including countries generally characterized by low 
levels of trust. This inclusion strengthens the previous results. Skaggs (1998) recalls the 
importance of trust in the functioning of any modern monetary system: the value of a 
currency depends on the willingness of the economic agents to accept it, especially since its 
intrinsic value is nearly zero and banknotes represent a debt of the central bank. Guiso, 
                                                 
1 Arrow (1974), p. 23.   2
Sapienza and Zingales (2004 b) show that trust towards a country is a fundamental variable 
in fostering inter-country trade and investments, even after controlling for a range of factors.   
 
Despite the growing literature on trust, the latter is still a difficult variable to be 
measured directly. Several surveys, as the World Value Survey and the European Value 
Survey, ask interviewees if, generally speaking, they trust strangers or not. Beside the 
answer being subjective, Gleaser et al. (1999) show that answers to questions contained in a 
survey are more likely to represent respondent’s trustworthiness rather than his/her 
generalized trust. For this reason it is necessary to find an alternative way to measure trust. 
Experimental economists have designed a game, which aims at capturing people’s trust: the 
so-called trust game proposed by Berg et al. (1995). Despite this tool allows for assessing 
trust directly, it restricts the information to the sample of experimental subjects. In order the 
experiment to be of large-scale use, its results should be generalized.  Social capital can be 
very helpful to reach this goal.  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide some evidence in favour of social capital as a good 
proxy for trust. Associative and attitudinal social capital can be observed ex ante more easily 
than trust (and trustworthiness) can; therefore if social capital can be used as a good proxy 
of trust, also its level can be known with some good approximation. Also in this sense the 
study of social capital is of major importance in economics.   
 
The seminal book on social capital is Putnam (1993). The author highlights the 
relationship between social capital and the quality of the regional administration in Italy. He 
shows that those regions that are more endowed with social capital also have more efficient 
administrative offices. The concept of social capital has not yet a precise definition; 
nevertheless, Putnam (1993) identifies an associative and an attitudinal social capital. The 
first is measured as membership to voluntary associations, the second as participation to 
local and national elections and referenda. The underlying idea is that those people who 
voluntarily spend time within associations and/or actively participate to the civil life through 
voting also have higher levels of social and civic responsibility. In turn this reflects in a 
better quality of the public administration. It must also be noted that those Italian regions 
that are characterized by a more efficient administration are also the richest ones.  
   3
After Putnam a growing interest for social capital has developed among economists. 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) provide the scientific community with an extensive survey of 
the works linking social capital and economic variables. They include growth, labour 
searching, happiness, and, above all, trust. Associative and attitudinal social capital can be 
observed ex ante more easily than trust (and trustworthiness) can; therefore if social capital 
can be used as a good proxy of trust, also its level can be known with some good 
approximation. Although up to now it is unclear whether trust is a product or a component 
or a prerequisite for social capital, it is widely accepted that social capital on one side and 
trust and trustworthiness on the other side appear together very often, especially at a micro 
level. Yet, so far there is no clear evidence about causality, nor about which type of social 
capital individuates trust the best. 
 
Following Putnam (1993) I will consider both associative and attitudinal social capital. 
Differently from him and from Guiso et al. (2004 a) I will not disentangle between these two 
types, in order to avoid a major problem linked to such a distinction (I will discuss this point 
later in the paper), but I will measure them jointly. Trust is assessed through a standard trust 
game
2 (see Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995). Social capital is measured as average 
weekly time spent within different types of voluntary associations; social networks linked to 
friendship are measured as well, since friendship is a typical social relationship based on 
trust.  
 
This paper shows that trust is strongly associated with some types of the considered 
associations and social networks. In particular time spent within political parties, religious 
associations and youth organizations, as well as long distance networks, displays a strong 
link with trust. The existence of such a link enables to predict trust of a (group of) 
individual(s), given his (their) level of social capital. This is valuable information for 
economic agents dealing with a specific person or a specific community. A second 
important result highlighted by this paper is the existence of strong differences based on 
gender and on geographical location. This is not surprising (for examples of the gender 
effect in games see Croson and Buchan, 1999), but has some relevant consequences in the 
assessment of trust based on social capital. 
 
                                                 
2 The experimental literature casts several doubts (see Camerer, 2003) about the fact that the trust game captures trustworthiness in 
the sense discussed further in this paper. As the focus of the present paper is on trust, I will deal only with it, leaving trustworthiness 
for further studies.   4
2.  Trust and reciprocity: a brief discussion of the trust game 
The trust game is a sequential game played by couples of players. The first to move 
(player A) is endowed with some money and has to decide if and how much he wants to 
give to the second player. This latter (player B) has no initial endowment and his final 
payoff depends on A’s decision. The sum A gives to B is tripled by the experimenter; 
eventually B must decide whether and how much he wants to send back to A. This decision 
ends the game, which is not repeated. Briefly, A’s payoff is given by the initial amount less 
the part passed to B plus the sum received by B. B’s final payoff is equal to the triple of A’s 
decision, minus what B himself gives back to A. Both players share the same information 
set, and the game is played under complete anonymity. The Nash equilibrium of the game is 
for A not to pass anything, as this is also the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy for 
player B. 
 
Camerer (2003) recalls that all the repetitions of this game all around the world 
display a significant share of players who do not play the Nash equilibrium. Berg et al. 
(1995) interpret this outcome as the result of players’ sentiments of trust and reciprocity. 
Player A invests on player B’s reciprocity in order to maximize his own payoff. Of course 
player A has to trust B’s reciprocity; the amount of money player B returns to player A is 
then a measure of reciprocity, or of trustworthiness (in A’s eyes). The exchange can be 
interpreted as A saying to B: “I give you my money (that is tripled) because I trust you to 
reciprocate, in order to thank me for giving some money. Remember that without this 
transfer your payoff would have been zero.” Of course the sentiments of trust and 
reciprocity are based on social norms I will not deal with here, as this is not the aim of the 
paper.  
 
The definition of trust I use in this paper is a broad definition. Here trust is confidence 
(or positive expectation) of receiving something back from the counterpart in the game. In 
other words, player A trusts that player B will pass something back, independently of the 
real motivation under B’s choice. The original interpretation of the game was that player B 
passed back some amount of money in order to reciprocate for A’s kindness.    
 
Unfortunately the explanation is not so simple. Motivations other than simple trust and 
reciprocity may play a role in determining the amount of the exchanged sums. In the 
following of this section I will summarize some theoretical models which can be helpful to 
understand the motivations behind players’ decisions.     5
The theoretical literature considers several motivations, which may affect players’ 
decisions so that they behave in an apparently naïf way. Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model 
considers inequity aversion (i.e. an unequal distribution is source of disutility for the player). 
According with the model, the individual weighs inequality less if the unbalance favours 
him, than if the unbalance benefits the opponent. It is possible to show that the optimal 
decision for player B can be to keep everything for himself or even to pass back the entire 
received amount; this decision depends on the parameters of the model
3. For player A it is 
rational to send more than one quarter of his initial endowment
4 only if he expects to receive 
back some amount of money. In this sense the game measures trust according to the model: 
player A trusts B to be sufficiently inequity averse to reciprocate. If player A expects player 
B to be enough inequity averse to look for a profitable
5 division of the entire pie, and player 
A attaches to this possibility a probability equal to 1, then he will send the whole initial 
endowment to B. If the attached probability is lesser than one, then A will pass an amount 
between the maximum and the equalitarian one
6. Notice that Fehr and Schmidt model 
accounts also for envy, which can decrease the passed amount given a certain positive 
probability attached to counterpart’s expected reciprocity. 
 
Charness and Rabin (2002) model of quasi maximin preferences could be another 
interesting way to interpret the results of a trust game, although their results are extreme. In 
this model, unless the sender’s utility coincides with his counterpart’s payoff and reciprocity 
does not affect his utility, the sender passes the entire amount if and only if he expects 
reciprocity, i.e. if and only if he believes that his game-mate is altruistic as well. Otherwise 
he passes any amount between 0 and the entire pie, according to the probability he attaches 
to B’s level of altruism. Again this means that the sender passes a positive sum only if he 
trusts (with a certain probability) his counterpart to be altruistic.  
 
Benabou and Tirole (2004) suggest a model with different individual degrees of 
altruism. This model relies on generosity (altruism) signalling; nevertheless the anonymity 
                                                 
3 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show that if this weight is lower than a certain threshold, the sender maximizes his own utility by keeping 
the entire initial amount for himself. For a standard trust game, it can be shown that this weight has to be weakly lower than 0.25 in 
order the sender to pass zero always. Note that, as players are inequity averse, any unbalance has a negative impact on the utility of 
each of them.  
4 See Ottone and Ponzano (2005). 
5 According with A’s point of view. 
6 Here the equalitarian amount is equal to ¼ of the initial endowment. Those who pass this share are likely to be motivated by 
fairness (50-50 splitting) although they do not expect anything back. For this reason I assume here ¼ as an important threshold, that I 
call “equalitarian”. To pass an amount larger than ¼, according to the theoretical literature, requires a high level of altruism or 
extreme parameters of the models (for example in the case of Fehr and Schmidt’s model). Although I can not exclude that some 
people are very altruistic or their utility functions include extreme parameters, I assume that they represent a negligeable minority of 
the population. As a consequence I use ¼ as a threshold, as explained in the text.   6
insured by the trust game should rule out, or at least strongly weaken, this motivation (as no 
signalling occurs).  
 
Rotemberg (2004) explicitly introduces trust in his model, in the form of expectations 
(consistently with the definition of trust I use here). His model applies to sequential games, 
and relies on altruism: the decision of the sender (first mover) depends on his counterpart’s 
expected response. Basically this means that he will pass more the more he expects (i.e. 
trusts) his game-mate to be altruistic. This model also accounts for the fact that the sender 
does not pass the amount judged the minimum by the responder: in this case the responder 
passes back a lower amount (or nothing), that includes a punishment for A. In addition, 
among others, it is worthy to recall Charness and Dufwenberg (2004) who propose a model, 
which considers trust in the counterpart as a major determinant of passed amounts. 
 
A more complicated model, based on fairness, is Rabin’s (1993), generalized by Falk 
and Fischbacher (2006). Rabin includes believes about the counterpart’s strategy. In addition 
first mover’s choice is affected also by his believes about counterpart’s believes on his 
move. Choices depend on kindness: in particular the more a player believes that the 
opponent is kind and the more he believes that the counterpart believes that he will be kind, 
the higher the stakes exchanged will be. Again, believes can be adjusted (or formed) on the 
basis of how much each player trusts the counterpart’s fairness.  
 
Basically all these theoretical models allow for the possibility of positive exchanges of 
money between the players, keeping the hypothesis of rationality. For A passing an amount 
higher than ¼ of his initial endowment, the presence of trust is very likely. As a 
consequence, in the following of this paper I will consider ¼ as an important threshold for 
player A’s decision. Moreover passing ¼ means to look for an equal redistribution of the 
initial pie, when B is expected not to pass back anything. The amount that B sends back to A 
can be interpreted also a measure of trustworthiness: when B receives a sum higher than ¼ 
of A’s initial endowment, B knows (because of the previous discussion of theoretical 
models) that A sent so much as he may expect something back. At this point B’s decision 
can be considered as a measure of the degree of fitness of A’s expectations. From A’s point 
of view this amounts to a measure of B’s trustworthiness. However the interpretation of B’s 
behaviour is more complex, as apparently a number of motivations (such as anger, 
gratefulness, etc.) are involved (see the references quoted above and Camerer, 2003), but as   7
the focus of this paper is trust, I will not deal with group B’s results
7.  Notice that I will call 
¼ of the initial A’s endowment “equalitarian amount” in the following of the paper.  
 
An alternative interpretation could be that the larger the individual stock of social 
capital, the more the individual expects the counterpart to be reciprocating and the more he 
gives him. Gleaser et al. (1999) show that people who declare to be trustful are rather 
trustworthy than trustful; this is a sort of projection of oneself over the strangers.This may 
hold also in the case of people who are reciprocating: they would expect the strangers to be 
reciprocating as well.  
 
The definition of social capital that I adopt here comes from several studies published 
during the last years (in particular see Putnam, 1993 and 2001, Portes, 1998 and 2000, Lin, 
2000 and Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). As Bruni and Sugden (2000) point out some 
philosophers and economists (namely Hume, Genovesi and Smith) had already interpreted 
trust in the light of social capital, but their approach was soon abandoned by economists. 
More recently Putnam (1993) considered associative and attitudinal social capital; he 
measures them as membership in voluntary organizations and participation to elections and 
referenda respectively.   
 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004 a) measure attitudinal social capital through 
donations of blood; they show that Italians who donate their blood more often, invest 
relatively more in stocks and bonds than the others citizens. Karlan (2005) reaches similar 
results measuring social capital à la Putnam.  
 
According to Carpenter et al. (2004) people with higher levels of social capital trust 
each other more. The causality mechanism is unclear and the literature does not provide any 
clear answer to the question whether social capital causes generalized trust or vice versa or 
neither. However, here the main hypothesis is that players with more social connections also 
expect more reciprocity from their counterpart in the game, i.e. they trust second mover’s 
reciprocity more. Should this be true, then we could use observed social capital as a good 
measure of underlying trust.  
 
Harris-White (2003) highlights the importance of trust linked with social capital in the 
development of poor economies. She shows that access to private credit in some Indian 
                                                 
7 However, those readers who might be interested in them, can ask the author for them.    8
regions is eased by belonging to a specific ethnic group. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) perform 
an experimental study on public good provision in Kenya; they find out that more ethnic 
homogeneity (which means high endowment of ethnic social capital) is associated to higher 
contributions. More in general Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) highlight that social capital 
affects several variables of economic interest, and in particular that it is strongly linked with 
trust. What we do not know yet is which type of social capital we should observe to get the 
best assessment of trust. The aim of this paper is to individuate which mix of attitudinal and 
associative social capital can be used to assess trust and if this is possible. Especially in 
developing countries the presence of trust among individuals is important for the creation of 
markets (such as the market of credit) that would be absent otherwise. The experience of the 
Grameen Bank (see Yunus, 2003) highlights the importance of the social network in order to 
access the credit (women must be gathered in small groups to get the loan) and to provide 
the bank with a collateral (in this case represented by social sanctions). 
 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) also show that, at least in some cases, social capital can 
be considered as a factor of production
8 for generalized trust (in general within groups of 
people). Again measuring social capital can provide important insights about the presence of 
trust.  
                                                 
8 There is huge debate on this point in the literature, thus I mention it for sake of completness, but I do not deal with details.   9
 
3.  Data and methodology 
Data come from three sessions of the basic setup of the trust game, involving 
undergraduate students of the universities of Oslo, Leuven and Torino. For each town one 
session was played. Italy was chosen as it is the reference country after Putnam (1993), 
Norway is typically considered a country with a huge endowment of civic engagement; 
eventually the Flanders are an area with a historical tradition of associative life. In addition 
all these three countries belong to the same broad cultural area (the West) and have attained 
similar levels of economic development. Different faculties were selected, and this in order 
to minimize the probability that the students knew and met each other. Students of group A 
and of group B could be from different faculties, but always from the same university, 
information which was given to all of them. They had no previous classes in game theory.  
 
Instructions were initially written in English (see appendix) and then translated into 
Norwegian, Flemish and Italian by two different mother-tongue persons separately for each 
language. A third person (namely a professor of the local Faculty of Economics expert in 
experiments) chose the translation he deemed to be the best one. This was given to a test-
group for check: some students were randomly chosen in the local Schools of Economics 
and asked to read both the instructions and the attached questionnaire and to indicate 
whether everything was clear and easily understandable. Control questions were also asked.  
 
Instructions were equal for both group A and B, so all the players had the same 
information. Anonymity was ensured during all the game. Participants were given no real 
money, and only a couple out of every fifty was paid according to their decisions. They all 
knew that the initial notional stake was 200 euro (on the possible bias induced by stake 
dimension see Johansson-Stenmann et al., 2005), and that they would have been paid 
according with the results of the lottery
9. As each session of the game lasted for about ten 
minutes, the maximum possible expected net pie amounted to 72 Euro per hour. 
 
First Students played the game, and then filled in a questionnaire containing questions 
aimed at measuring their relational and associative social capital; the questionnaire collected 
information also about some individual characteristics such as gender, having or not a job, 
living alone, ethnicity and nationality.  A serial number was attached to both the 
questionnaire and the form of the game (see appendix); in addition a coupon with the same 
                                                 
9 The winner numbers were drawn publicly by a professor of the Faculty not involved in the experiment.   10
number was taken by each student in order to make him/her recognizable for the payment. 
The couples effectively paid were drawn in public and the numbers were announced on the 
webpage of the the School
10. The drawn students were then paid separately and in different 
moments of the day in order to prevent them to meet each other and ensure anonymity.   
 
A total of 506 students participated as Subjects  A. Each session lasted about ten 
minutes, included the time necessary in order for the students to fill in the questionnaire. 
This questionnaire (see Appendix II) asked participants to indicate how much time they 
spend weekly on average within each of the listed types of voluntary associations. Players 
were also asked to indicate how much time they spend in other social activities such as 
active communication through the phone or the Internet, and how much time they usually 
spend with friends per week. Other individual characteristics such as gender, having a job, 
living alone, etc. were collected and used as additional controls. Especially gender had to be 
considered, due to the ambiguous effect it has on people’s choices (see for example Croson 
and Buchan, 1999). The number of brothers and sisters, as well as the country of origin, was 
also recorded. Having brothers and/or sisters could increase individual social capital, 
through more numerous social relationships. Coming from a foreign country could foster 
strong ties à la Granovetter (1973) and/or induce mistrust through discrimination.  
 
It can be noted that my measure of social capital includes both associative and 
attitudinal social capital. Time spent within associations indicates both if the individual is 
member of a specific type of association (associative social capital) and the intensity of his 
participation (attitudinal social capital, especially for pro-social associations). I believe that 
this joint measure is better than the two disjoint ones. This is because membership to an 
association can represent different levels of social capital, depending on how much the 
member “uses” the network. Using only the information of membership would mean to 
assume that any membership in a certain type of association has the same value in terms of 
social capital for all the members.  This is a very strong and unrealistic assumption. 
Considering the average weekly time spent in the association helps solving this problem and 
provides a measure of the attitude of the member towards the activities and the goals of the 
association. Thus, for example, the time spent within pro-social associations (such as the 
Red Cross, political parties, etc.) is assumed to be a measure of the member’s attitude 
towards pro-social activities.  
                                                 
10 Ethnicity was recorded on an objective and subjective way: participants were asked to indicate the country of origin and whether 
they felt citizens of their own region, or country or Europe or other.   11
 
As experimental subjects are undergraduate students, specific attention was paid also 
to the associations which are typical of youth and students (for the complete list, see 
Appendix II).  
 
Data are analyzed through tests of equality of means and econometric tools, namely 
OLS and probit regressions. In particular I focus on some interesting outcomes. First of all 
the Nash equilibrium (i.e. player A passes nothing, and player B ends with 0), then the 
“equalitarian outcome” (i.e. player A passes ¼ of the initial pie, so that if B does not 
reciprocate they both end with an equal amount of money); thirdly the “complete trust 
outcome” (i.e. player A passes all his endowment). Eventually also intermediate outcomes 
(i.e. between ¼ and the entire initial endowment) are analyzed.  
 
Despite the causality between the two variables is debated, the positive correlation is 
widely accepted. Nevertheless the extant literature presents an important difference, a 
shortcoming with respect to this papers. As a consenquence the results of this paper are 
more accurate: they show that not only membership, bul also its intensity positively 
correlates with trust. In addition, the assessment about the types of associations, which are 
correlated with trust, is reinforced by the accuracy of the measure. The main difference with 
respect to the extant literature is that the link between social capital and trust has never been 
studied, to my knowledge, by the means of an experiment. Generally trust has been assessed 
on the basis of questionnaires, but they might fail to reveal the true level of trust of a person. 
In contrast an experiment induces the participants to show their behaviour. In addition the 
use of a trust game allows for the construction of an almost continuous variable, whilst the 
questionnaires generally allow only for discrete scales. The added value of a continuous 
variable is its ability to capture nuances with more precision than a discrete variable can 
have.   12
 
4.  Results 
This section is divided in two parts: the first presents the results of the descriptive 
statistics, the second shows the results of the OLS and probit regressions. A difference to be 
highlighted is the following: when tests of equality of means are applied, data are grouped 
on the basis of dichotomist variables; in the case of participation to voluntary associations, 
this means that I consider active participation in general, but not time spent within each of 
them. OLS and probit models apply to time spent in each type of voluntary associations. 
Nationality of participants is introduced through country dummies.  
 
Players of type A passed 91.16 euro on average, which means 45.6% of the initial 
endowment. Their trust was repaid 94.30 euro on average, i.e. 33.9% of the average received 
sum
11. This means that players of type A invested their money well, as, on average, they got 
a positive yield. Figure 1 shows the passed amounts. It is possible to notice that a large part 
(around 30%) of the participants played the “equalitarian” strategy.  
 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
Results for non parametric tests applied to the whole sample are reposted in Table 1. 
First of all I analyze the Nash equilibrium under the hypothesis of monetary payoff-
maximizing subjects, i.e. player A’s decision to pass nothing. Out of 506 players of type A, 
17 played the Nash equilibrium. All these students have very low levels of social capital. 
Namely none of them is member of a religious or a youth association and only one is 
member of a political party, but declared not to spend time within it. Nevertheless there is 
almost no significant effect of social capital on this outcome (anyway the sign of the 
correlation – negative – is the expected one). Only membership to students’ associations 
(see Table 1) is negatively linked with this decision in a significant way. No significant 
gender effect is detected. Notice, however, that these tests are performed dividing the 
sample according being or not being member of a specific type of associations. Therefore 
the weakness of the results with respect to the following econometric analysis reflects the 
poor measurement of social capital provided by this dichotomist variable.  
 
The equalitarian outcome (i.e. those who pass ¼ of the initial pie) is positively linked 
to being male; being Norwegian (without distinguishing according to the gender) and being 
member of political parties are negatively linked to playing this outcome. On the opposite 
                                                 
11 It is worthy to recall that what player A passes to player B is tripled by the experimenter.    13
side, Italians and the Flemish as well as those who spend time in students’ organizations 
within their own school show a positive and significant link with playing this choice.  
 
The gender effect is persistently significant for all the chosen thresholds presented in 
Table 1: males always pass more than women, and the relative difference is increasing in 
the amount. This evidence is apparently in favour of the gender effect hypothesis. Two 
other variables show persistence: geography and membership to political parties. Notice 
that Norwegian passed on average more than the Flemish and Italians; this difference is 
partially due to Norwegian female students, who passed significantly more than the female 
participants from other countries. Eventually membership to political parties
12 measures 
strong political involvement: the correlation between this membership and higher passed 
stakes is positive, thus representing a support for Putnam (1993). In turn this also means 
that more social capital is positively associated with trust.  
 
After analyzing the data pooled together,  I split them according to gender (see Table 
2). The strongest result is again that membership to political parties is positively and 
significantly correlated with high stakes. However this result is consistent and persistent for 
males only; female students associate to political parties significantly less than males, and 
there are no sufficient data to perform the analysis for some intervals of values. Again a 
strong geographical difference emerges: the Flemish are associated with lower stakes, 
whilst Norwegians are willing to pass more. Italians are in an intermediate position between 
Norwegians and the Flemish, as they do not display any significant difference with respect 
to the other two subsamples. Notice that the geographical difference still holds, even after 
controlling for the gender effect (and vice versa).  
 
A first conclusion that can be retrieved from these results is that geographical and 
gender differences can play a major role in the level of trust. This means that participation 
to different voluntary associations can predict trust, after controlling for gender and 
geographical effects. Furthermore the strongest predictor of trust up to now appears to be 
membership to political parties.  
 
 
                                                 
12 Differently from Putnam (1993) I do not measure participation to elections: this is voluntary and free in Italy (the country studied 
by Putnam), but it is compulsory in Belgium (those who do not vote are fined by an amount of about 200 euro). Therefore this 
measure would have been strongly biased. However, as not all the people who vote are members of political parties, the measure I 
use here is much stronger than Putnam’s to assess political (civic?) participation.   14
4.2.  OLS and probit analyses 
The dependent variable of the OLS model
13 is the amount passed by player A to 
player B he is matched to. The OLS regression (see Table 3) is performed using stepwise 
removal, starting from empty model (maximum entry p-value < 0.1). The regressions are 
run for the full sample, as well as for those who passed more than ¼ of the initial 
endowment. Given the previously detected influence of the country of origin, and the 
possible presence of fixed effects, dummies for countries are present in all the  regressions. 
Also a gender dummy (1 for male, 0 for female) is introduced as a control.  
 
Political engagement confirms its importance: not only membership, but also active 
participation (i.e. time spent in the organization) is positively correlated to the passed sum; 
Participation to political parties is a very important component of individual social capital, 
as it entails civic engagement. Also time spent within religious associations is positively 
linked to the passed amount. Religious values (in particular Christian values) increase 
people’s trust in the game-mate’s reciprocity and they are also likely to foster altruism. 
Thirdly, spending time in youth organizations appears to correlate positively and 
significantly, although the coefficient is smaller. Interaction with other young people and 
reciprocity taught within these organizations reflect also in interactions with strangers and 
in trusting others’ reciprocity. Participants who spend time within organizations for the 
rights of animals show a strongly negative and significant coefficient. However they 
represent less than 2% of the whole sample, so this result appears to be rather weak.  
 
I ran the same regression excluding those who passed more than ¼ of the initial 
endowment (see Table 3 column 2), to verify the robustness of the detected effects also in 
the higher-amount group. Previous results are confirmed: participation to political, youth 
and religious voluntary associations is positively and significantly linked to the passed 
amount. It is worthy to notice that in this subsample the results are stronger than for the 
whole sample. Also spending time within organizations with social goals (such as the Red 
Cross, or elderly caring) has a positive correlation with the amount passed and this result is 
significant for both the male and the female subsample. Notice also that all the coefficients 
for time spent within different types of associations are smaller for the subsample than for 
the whole sample. This means that the association with social capital is stronger for 
disentangling between trusting and non trusting than in order to determine the level of trust 
                                                 
13 As data here are censored at a 0 level, also tobit regressions were ran. As their results do not differ from those of the OLS analyses, 
they are not shown.   15
among those who display trust. The only coefficient that does not decrease significantly is 
the one associated to gender: the difference between males and females is almost constant 
across the two groups. This observation is also confirmed by the probit analysis (see Table 
4).  
 
The contribution of long distance networks (i.e. phone calls, communications through 
the Internet and through text messages) is weaker in this subgroup. Only communications 
through the Internet are significantly associated with trust, and the coefficient is around 
30% lower than the average. Also the geographical effect is weaker, although strongly 
significant. This means that among those who display trust, the geographic effect is weaker 
than for the entire population: it is more a matter of whether you trust or not than how much 
you trust.  Contrary to my expectations, time spent with friends is never significantly 
associated with trust. 
 
Probit regressions (see Table 4) are run for four different outcomes: inequity 
aversion, passing more than ¼ of the initial endowment, passing more than ½ of the 
endowment and passing the entire endowment. 
 
The probit analysis for passing more than ¼ of the initial endowment can be 
interpreted as an analysis of the association between social capital and trust. As I have 
highlighted, those who passed more than this amount can be deemed as trusting people. The 
probit analysis (column 2 of Table 4) shows that time spent within youth organizations and 
religious associations does not correlate with passing ¼ of the initial endowment. However 
these two variables correlate with the level of trust. This means that they are not good 
proxies to identify the choice of trusting or not, but they are important to assess the level of 
individual trust among people who display trust. Spending time within political parties, 
instead, is a good predictor of both a trusting behaviour and the level of trust. In this sense 
political participation can be considered a stronger indicator than the other two. The gender 
of the respondent and his geographical location are predictors of both the presence and the 
level of trust.  
 
The probit regression for passing more (dependent variable = 1) or less or exactly 
(dependent variable = 0) than ½ of the pie confirms the results previously obtained. 
Spending time within political, youth and/or religious organizations increases the 
probability of passing more than 100 euro (i.e. ½ of the initial endowment). Eventually the   16
last probit is ran considering “passing the entire initial endowment” as dependent variable. 
This regression provides further support for the positive link between trust and participation 
within political and youth organizations. Time spent in religious associations, instead, has 
here no significant correlation.  
 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 give a graphic representation of the previous results. They are 
based on quadratic functions. It is interesting to notice that for time spent either in political 
parties or religious associations the curve is concave, meaning a positive, but decreasing 
marginal correlation with trust. On the opposite side, the marginal correlation with time 
spent within youth organizations has a convex shape. This graphical analysis provides an 
important contribution to the understanding of the link between social capital and trust. 
According to the econometric analysis spending time within political parties is the strongest 
predictor of trust. In a sense, the graphic analysis confirms this result: spending 10 hours 
within political parties predicts giving more than ¾ of the initial endoment, while this 
figure decreases to about ¾ for religious associations and to about ½ for youth 
organizations. Nevertheless, the individual trust is marginally increasing in time spent 
within them.    17
 
5.  Conclusions 
Since 1993 social capital has become a major variable of study for economists. One of 
the main and more accepted results of their studies is a strong link between social capital 
and trust. The aim of this paper is to analyze the possibility of measuring trust (which is 
difficult to observe) by using social capital (which is easier to measure). Moreover the paper 
analyzes which types of social networks are the best predictors of trust. 
 
Instead of using only the information about membership to particular associations, this 
paper measures social capital as the average weekly time spent by the individuals within 
these types of associations. This provides a better measure of the intensity with which the 
individual “uses” the social network, and hence a better assessment of the level of social 
capital. 
 
The results are supportive of the possibility of assessing individual trust by using 
social capital. For the youth, in particular, spending time within political parties, religious 
associations and youth organizations is positively and robustly associated with trust. In 
addition also spending time in active communications through the Internet shows a positive 
association. This can be interpreted as follows: people who invest in social capital by/for 
maintaining long distance relationships also trust more; hence being part of an Internet-
based network is valuable social capital in order to predict trust. These results indicate that 
we can not take participation to any network as a measure of social capital to assess trust, 
but we have to choose those networks, which are more focused on services for the society 
(as political parties, religious and youth organizations are).  
 
However some caveats need highlighting. First of all a strong gender effect is present, 
and in particular males appear to trust more than women. Second a strong geographic effect 
was detected. These two effects weaken the previous conclusions: when measuring 
generalized trust we must also account for specific (cultural?) effects, linked to the 
geographical location. As a result we can conclude that social capital is useful to assess 
individual generalized trust, but, when looking for international comparisons, geographical 
controls must be included.  
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APPENDIX I: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
There are two groups of students: A and B (both from the University of...). Each Student A is 
anonymously and randomly matched to another Student B.  
Step 1 
Student A receives the notional sum of 200€ and decides how to share this amount between 
himself and Student B. 
Step 2 
The amount Student A passed to Student B is tripled; in other words, for each euro that Student 
A passes, Student B receives 3€. Student B knows that the received sum is determined in this 
way. 
Step 3 
Student B decides how to share the received sum between himself and Student A. 
Step 4 
A couple of students will be randomly drawn and paid according to their decisions. These two 
students will be separately paid to avoid them to meet.  
Warning: 
•  All the decisions remain totally anonymous. 
•  These instructions are perfectly identical for all the components of both groups A and 
B. 
 
You are a student of group…  (exactly as all the other students in this classroom). 
•  Please, write in part A of the attached form how much you want to pass to Student B. 
•  Then answer the attached questionnaire. 
•  Take the numbered paper. If your number is drawn, you have to show it in order to be paid. 
•  Handle back the form and the questionnaire. 
 
The drawn number will be announced during one of the following classes and published on the 
website. 
 






You divide 200€ between yourself and a Student B. Write down the 










You receive three times the amount Student A  




You divide this amount between yourself and Student A. 
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APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1.  Below there is a list of different voluntary associations. Indicate how much time on average 
(hours and minutes) you spend weekly in each of them. Indicate also the number of associations 
of the same type you are a member. Moreover explicitly indicate whether you are not a member 
of some of the listed types. 
 
Associations  Time  Number  Not a 
member 
Sports associations (including gyms)        h      min.    ⁫ 
Religious associations        h      min    ⁫ 
Cultural associations (music, theatre, arts, ...)        h      min    ⁫ 
Own Faculty students’ associations (i.e..)        h      min    ⁫ 
Other students’ associations        h      min    ⁫ 
       Specify 
Environmental associations (WWF, Greenpeace, 
...) 
      h      min    ⁫ 
Associations for animals’ rights (es.)        h      min     
Political parties/associations        h      min    ⁫ 
Youth clubs (Scouts, ...)        h      min    ⁫ 
Social aimed associations (i.e. Red Cross, …)      
Other associations         h      min    ⁫ 
       Specify 
    
2.  How much time on average do you spend weekly in phone talks with friends  (including 
Skype)? ______ h    ______ min  
 
3.  How many short text messages do you send from your mobile on average per week? _      _____ 
 
4.  How much time (hours and minutes) on average do you spend weekly in active Internet 
communications (reading and writing emails, chatting,  ...)?  
_ ____ h    ______ min  
 
5.  How much free time on average do you spend weekly with your friends?  
______ h    ______ min  
 
6.  How many brothers do you have?    ___    __    
How many sisters do you have?         _    __      21
 
7.  Have you a student job currently?  ⁫ Yes ⁫ No     
 
8.  Do you live in the city of the university?   (domicile)  ⁫ Yes  ⁫ No 
If no, during the week do you live … (in a student room/apartment)?  ⁫ Yes ⁫ No 
 
9.  Which country and province are you from? 
Country: _  _________________________ Region:_________________________   
 
10. Are you the owner of the apartment you live in? ⁫ Yes   ⁫ No 
If no, please indicate how many crowns per month you pay for the rent of your room/apartment 
_____________ 
 
11. To which of the following group do you feel to belong firstly                                              ⁫ own 
region       ⁫ Norwegian    ⁫ Scandinavian       ⁫ European          
⁫ Other (specify):_______         
                                                                                    
12. Gender:         ⁫ M   ⁫ F 
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Table 1. Comparison of groups' means (Hotelling test)
member non member p-value
Nash
Students' (own school) 0.007 0.039 0.074
Students' (other schools) 0.088 0.028 0.049
Norwegian 0.058 0.021 0.024
Equalitarian
Students' (own school) 0.397 0.255 0.002
Italian 0.348 0.269 0.079
Flemish 0.396 0.198 0.000
Norwegian 0.065 0.379 0.000
Male 0.251 0.324 0.066
More than 1/4 of the initial endowment
Political parties 0.755 0.583 0.019
Student's (own school) 0.527 0.621 0.054
Italian 0.536 0.486 0.084
Flemish 0.492 0.689 0.000
Norwegian 0.823 0.508 0.000
Male 0.641 0.558 0.056
More than 1/2 of the initial endowment
Political parties 0.429 0.279 0.029
Students' (own school) 0.221 0.316 0.039
Sports 0.256 0.342 0.029
Italian 0.196 0.326 0.004
Flemish 0.212 0.362 0.000
Norwegian 0.510 0.206 0.000
Male 0.368 0.237 0.001
Entire initial endowment
Political parties 0.224 0.121 0.041
Students' (other schools) 0.236 0.124 0.062
Environmental orgs.  0.333 0.125 0.018
Flemish 0.290 0.164 0.013
Norwegian 0.187 0.108 0.014
Male 0.169 0.100 0.020
Reported values represent the mean of the subgroup. Data are 
grouped according to being member or not of the association listed
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Table 2. Comparison of groups' means (Hotelling test)
Gender based subsamples
member non member p-value member non member p-value
Nash
Students' (own school) 0.007 0.039 0.074 0.176 0.025 0.001
Students' (other schools) 0.088 0.028 0.049 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Fehr
Political parties n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.150 0.337 0.085
Students' (own school) 0.380 0.215 0.017 0.438 0.288 0.017
Environmental orgs. n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.750 0.319 0.068
Flemish 0.340 0.187 0.008 0.434 0.211 0.000
Italian n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.409 0.300 0.097
Norwegian 0.077 0.319 0.000 0.049 0.427 0.000
More than 1/4 of the initial endowment
Political parties 0.810 0.624 0.091 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Student's (own school) 0.540 0.669 0.094 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Flemish 0.567 0.694 0.047 0.447 0.673 0.000
Italian n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.455 0.588 0.054
Norwegian 0.785 0.584 0.004 0.852 0.450 0.000
More than 1/2 of the initial endowment
Political parties 0.667 0.338 0.003 0.350 0.251 0.000
Students' (own school) n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.124 0.274 0.008
Sports 0.321 0.436 0.076 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Cultural associations 0.212 0.394 0.045 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Environmental orgs. 1.000 0.360 0.022 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Flemish n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.151 0.327 0.000
Italian 0.261 0.414 0.028 0.121 0.270 0.012
Norwegian 0.569 0.289 0.000 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Entire initial endowment
Political parties 0.381 0.148 0.006 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Student's (own school) n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.027 0.124 0.017
Sports n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.074 0.131 0.100
Environmental orgs.  0.667 0.162 0.020 n.s. n.s. n.s.
Flemish n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.059 0.143 0.016
Norwegian n.s. n.s. n.s. 0.173 0.073 0.011
Reported values represent the mean of the subgroup. Data are grouped according to being member or not of the 
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Table 3. OLS regression for passed amount by players of type A. 
(standard errors between brackets)
Whole sample Male players Female players
Political parties 4.76 5.06 9.12
(1.23)*** (1.16)*** (5.19)*
Religious associations 4.41 5.93
(2.25)** (2.70)**
Youth organizations 2.44 2.31
(0.99)** (1.06)**
Cultural associations -5.27 4.53
(2.65)** (2.21)**














Constant 75.25 21.70 79.07
(4.23)*** (0.78)*** (6.36)***
Number of observations 431 191 240
R-squared 0.114 0.104 0.169






















   28
Table 4. Probit regression: marginal effects (standard errors in brackets)
1/4 more than 1/4 more than 1/2 Whole pie 
Political parties -0.09 0.10 0.04 0.02
(0.04)** (0.04)** (0.02)** (0.008)**
Religious associations 0.06
(0.02)**
Youth organizations 0.02 0.01
(0.01)* (0.006)*
Social - goal associations 0.03
(0.01)**
Students' orgs. (other schools)  -0.04
(0.02)**




Telephone 0.02 (0.01) 0.01
(0.01)** (0.006)* (0.004)***
Text messages -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.000)*
Male -0.08 0.09 0.13 0.08
(0.04)* (0.05)* (0.04)*** (0.03)**
Norwegian -0.29 0.31 0.22 0.19
(0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.06)*** (0.05)***
Born in the country 0.22
(0.06)***
Number of observations 434 434 429 429
Pseudo R-squared 0.111 0.087 0.085 0.099
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Figure 2. Correlation between passed amounts and time spent
within political parties
Figure 3. Correlation between passed amounts and time spent
within religious associations
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